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Abstract
In this paper, the problem of secure sensor activation is studied for an Internet
of Battlefield Things (IoBT) system in which an attacker compromises a set of
the IoBT sensors for the purpose of eavesdropping and acquiring information
about the battlefield. In the considered model, each IoBT sensor seeks to de-
cide whether to transmit or not based on its utility. The utility of each sensor
is expressed in terms of the redundancy of the data transmitted, the secrecy
capacity and the energy consumed. Due to the limited communication range of
the IoBT sensors and their uncertainty about the location of the eavesdroppers,
the problem is formulated as a graphical Bayesian game in which the IoBT sen-
sors are the players. Then, the utilities of the IoBT sensors are modified to take
into account the effect of activating each sensor on the utilities of its neighbors,
in order to achieve better system performance. The modified game is shown
to be a Bayesian potential game, and a best response algorithm that is guar-
anteed to find a Nash equilibrium of the game is proposed. Simulation results
show the tradeoff between the information transmitted by the IoBT sensors and
the desired secrecy level. Simulation results also demonstrate the effectiveness
of the proposed approach in reducing the energy consumed compared to the
baseline in which all the IoBT sensors are activated. The reduction in energy
consumption reaches up to 98% compared to the baseline, when the number of
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sensors is 5000.
1. Introduction
Internet of Things (IoT) devices such as sensors, autonomous vehicles, and
drones are projected to be integrated in military networks, forming the Internet
of Battlefield Things (IoBT) [1, 2]. In a military setting, the information col-
lected from all IoBT devices can provide accurate and timely information about
a certain battlefield environment, thus improving the efficiency of the military
operations. However, given the massive number of IoBT devices, activating
all the IoBT sensors simultaneously at a given time will incur significant cost,
especially in terms of energy consumption. Moreover, IoBT sensor measure-
ments are often correlated based on their distance [3], and, hence, tremendous
amount of redundant information will be transmitted by the densely deployed
IoBT sensors. Thus, there is a need to design efficient schemes for IoBT sensors
activation, which determine the optimal set of activated sensors that minimizes
both the energy consumed and the redundancy in the information transmitted.
Moreover, many IoBT devices have limited computational capabilities and
therefore can not implement strong security measures. Thus, they are prone to
multitude of security attacks and can be easily compromised by attackers, espe-
cially in a battlefield setting [4]. One common attack scenario is one in which an
adversary can compromise a set of the IoBT sensors in order to eavesdrop the
information circulating within the IoBT[1]. Therefore, each IoBT sensor must
deliver its information securely from the eavesdroppers. In order to achieve secu-
rity, physical layer security is favorable to be employed as it allows each sensor to
deliver its information perfectly secure from eavesdroppers even in the presence
of eavesdroppers with unlimited computational capabilities. Thus, each sensor
will deliver its information with a rate which is equal to the secrecy capacity
i.e. the maximum capacity such that the information is perfectly secured from
the eavesdroppers. However, the energy overhead of activating a node with low
secrecy capacity will be significant. Thus, the IoBT should take into account
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the secrecy capacity of the nodes in order to find the optimal activation policy.
Several node activation schemes have been proposed for wireless sensor net-
works, the majority of which focus on energy efficiency [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
13, 14]. In [5, 6, 7, 8], different routing protocols are proposed that control the
sensors’ sleep duration for energy efficient data collection in wireless sensor net-
works. In [9] and [10], distributed protocols for energy conservation in wireless
sensor networks, using sensor activation schemes, are proposed. In [9], a wireless
sensor network with event driven traffic is considered, and a distributed protocol
is proposed in which each node chooses to switch to the active mode only if the
received signal power is above a certain threshold, thus significantly reducing
the energy consumed in the network when no data is being transmitted. In
[10], a distributed protocol to reduce energy consumption in a wireless sensor
network is proposed which sets nodes transmitting redundant information to
sleep mode, using information entropy and correlation graphs. Centralized ap-
proaches for optimal node activation are proposed in [11] and [12]. The authors
in [12] analyze the optimal set of activated sensors that minimizes the Fischer
information matrix of an unknown estimated parameter. In [11], the optimal set
of activated nodes that minimizes energy and data redundancy is determined,
using a compressive sensing scheme. Node activation schemes that maximize
the area coverage while reducing data redundancy are developed in [13] and
[14]. In [13], the proposed protocol reduces redundancy while maintaining cov-
erage by allowing each sensor to join the network, if no other sensor is activated
within the same communication range. In [14], a predictive scheme is proposed
that allows each sensor to decide whether or not to check redundancy at each
time slot, thus reducing unnecessary redundancy checks and consequently the
computational energy consumed.
On the other hand, there have been few schemes for secure sensor activation.
In [15], a differential game is proposed for a wireless sensor network in which an
attacker chooses the malware injection rate while the network operator controls
the sleep rate of the sensor nodes in addition to the recovery rate in order to
limit the spread of the malware. In [16], an evolutionary game is formulated for
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a wireless sensor network in which each sensor chooses the transmission power
that maximizes the secrecy rate while minimizing the energy consumed. More
recently, in [17], the authors investigated the security of a large scale wireless
network containing both legitimate transmitters and eavesdroppers. The legit-
imate transmitters seek to find the optimal probability of node activation that
maximizes their secrecy energy efficiency whereas the eavesdroppers find the
probability of node activation that minimizes their energy efficiency. The prob-
lem is formulated as a noncooperative game between the set of transmitters and
the set of eavesdroppers, and it is shown the magnitude of degradation of the
secrecy energy efficiency of the legitimate transmitters due to the increase in
the density of eavesdroppers.
However, most of the existing approaches of sensor activation are either cen-
tralized such as in [11] and [12] or not fully distributed such as in [17]. Central-
ized approaches are not favorable for IoBT as they incur significant communica-
tion and computation overhead. Further, existing approaches either maximize
the secrecy capacity such as in [16] and [17] or minimize data redundancy such
as in [10, 11, 12]. Thus, there is no existing scheme that minimizes data redun-
dancy while maximizing the secrecy capacity. Such a scheme is crucial for the
successful operation of a mission critical system existing in adversarial environ-
ment, such as the IoBT, in which it is necessary to deliver the data as securely
as possible. Besides, eliminating redundant transmitted data is essential for
the IoBT in two main aspects. First, switching sensors sending redundant in-
formation to sleep mode helps in extending the lifetime of the IoBT devices.
Second, removing redundant data significantly decreases congestion and there-
fore ensures the timely delivery of the information, which is a key requirement
for IoBT.
The main contribution of this paper is a distributed scheme for sensor acti-
vation that is suitable for IoBT environment. The proposed scheme reduces the
redundancy in the transmitted data while increasing the secrecy of the delivered
information, using a graphical Bayesian game approach. In particular, the key
contributions are summarized as follows:
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• We propose a distributed approach for IoBT sensor activation that aims
at achieving energy efficiency, through deactivating sensors transmitting
redundant information, while maintaining desirable secrecy. In terms of
security, we consider a realistic attack in which an attacker compromises a
set of the IoBT sensors for eavesdropping. Thus, in the proposed approach,
each sensor node decides whether to transmit or not according to a utility
function that captures the conditional entropy of the sensor’s data given
the measurements of its neighbors, its secrecy capacity, and the energy
consumed.
• We formulate the node activation problem as a graphical Bayesian game
whose players are the IoBT sensors. The formulated game captures the
limited communication range and resources of each IoBT sensor. In par-
ticular, the utility of each IoBT sensor depends on the actions of neighbors
that are in its communication range. The proposed Bayesian game also
accounts for the uncertainty of each IoBT sensor about the location of the
eavesdroppers by maintaining a belief about the probability of a neighbor
being compromised. Therefore, the proposed approach does not require
exact knowledge of the location of the eavesdroppers.
• In order to guarantee the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
as well as to achieve better system performance, we consider the alternate
game where the repercussion utility for each IoBT sensor is used. The
repercussion utililty allows each IoBT sensor to take into account the
decrease in the utility in its neighbors upon its activation. We show that
the modified game is a Bayesian potential game.
• In the modified game, the utility of each sensor depends on the actions of
the neighbor of its neighbors. Thus, in order to reach the Nash equilibrium,
we propose a distributed learning scheme, using best response dynamics,
suitable for the proposed game, in which each sensor broadcasts advertised
action, from a sensor in its communication range, to its neighbors.
• Simulation results show the tradeoff between the information transmit-
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ted by the IoBT sensors and the desired secrecy level. Simulation results
also show the effectiveness of the proposed approach in reducing the en-
ergy consumed compared to the baseline in which all the IoBT sensors
are activated. The reduction in energy consumption reaches up to 98%
compared to the baseline.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the IoBT system
model and the considered problem of secure sensor activation. Section III
presents the proposed IoBT graphical Bayesian game and its solution approach.
Simulation results are shown in Section IV. Finally, conclusions are drawn in
Section V.
2. System Model
Consider an IoBT network that includes of a set M of M sensors deployed
to collect information about a certain phenomenon and subsequently transmit
the collected information to their local sinks using an uplink wireless commu-
nication link. The IoBT network spans an N ×N rectangular grid. Thus, the
location of any node i is represented by its coordinates li = (xi, yi). Each sen-
sor transmits information to its local sink using a transmit power value P over
orthogonal channels. Further, the simplified path loss model is used to model
the attenuation of the signal transmitted by each sensor with distance. AWGN
with variance γ2 is present at each receiver. Thus, the received power by the
local sink from sensor i’s transmission is given by
Pi =
A|dai|−αP
γ2
, (1)
where A is the path loss coefficient, α is the path loss exponent, dai is the
distance between the local sink and sensor i and is given by dai = (xsi −
xa)
2 + (ysi − ya)2, where la = (xa, ya) is the location of the local sink and
ls,i = (xsi , ysi) is the location of sensor i. In a practical IoBT, the sensors’
readings are correlated based on their locations [3]. In particular, the closer
the sensors are located, the more likely they are collecting similar information.
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Figure 1: System Model
Thus, the information collected by the sensors is assumed to be distributed
according to a multivariate Gaussian distribution which is often used to model
spatial correlations between observations [19]. Let Y = (Yi)i∈M be the vector
of sensors’ observations, where Yi is a scalar whose value corresponds to sensor’s
i measurement. The joint distribution of Y is given by
P(Y = y) =
1
(2pi)
M
2
e−
1
2 (y−µ)TΣ−1(y−µ), (2)
where µ is the mean and Σ is the covariance matrix given by Σ = (σij)i,j∈M
where each σij is a function of of the distance dij between sensors i and j.
Typically, σij is chosen to decay exponentially with the distance using the radial
basis function [3] and is thus given by
σij = βe
− ||(xsi ,ysi )−(xsj ,ysj )||
2
2λ2 , (3)
where the parameters β and λ are chosen to capture the correlation among the
sensor measurements. The values of β and λ are usually estimated so that the
Gaussian distribution matches the observed sensors’ measurements.
Thus, in order to reduce redundancy in the transmitted information and
to save energy, each IoBT sensor decides whether to activate and transmit
information or switch to a sleep mode. Hence, the decision of IoBT sensor
i is made based on the conditional entropy D(Yi|Wi) of its data Yi given
the data generated by its neighbors Ni i.e., the IoBT sensors that are in its
communication range, where Ni is the set of neighbors of sensor i given by
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Ni = {j ∈ M|dij < r}, r is the communication range, and Wi = {Yj , j ∈ Ni}
is the set of data generated by Ni. The conditional entropy is given by
D(Yi|Wi) = H(Yi ∪Wi)−H(Wi), (4)
where, in general, the entropy of a multivariate Gaussian distribution of a set
K of K random observations and of convariance matrix Σ is given by
H(K) = K
2
+
K
2
log(2pi) +
1
2
log |Σ|. (5)
In this IoBT, an attacker is interested in compromising a subset of the IoBT
sensors for the purpose of eavesdropping and acquiring information about the
IoBT. We denote by X the set of compromised sensors.
The uncompromised IoBT sensors do not have full knowledge of the set of
compromised sensors. Thus, each IoBT sensor i forms a belief pi about the
compromised sensors in its neighborhood, where pi is the probability that a
sensor j ∈ Ni is compromised. Hence, in order to ensure that the data is
delivered to the base station as securely as possible, each sensor i ∈ M \ X
decides whether to transmit or switch to a sleep mode based on the secrecy
capacity. It is assumed that the link between sensor i and its local sink becomes
insecure if any of the neighboring eavesdroppers successfully decode the message.
Thus, the secrecy capacity of the link between sensor i and its local sink is given
by the channel capacity of the link between sensor i and its local sink minus
maximum of capacities that are individual achievable among the neighboring
eavesdroppers [18]. Hence, the secrecy capacity is derived as follows. Let Ti
be the type of sensor i where Ti = c if the sensor is compromised and Ti = u
otherwise. Let < σ1, σ2, ..., σNi > be the ordered sequence of neighbors of sensor
i in Ni based on their distance to sensor i and let Ii = (Iij)j∈Ni be an indicator
vector with each entry Iij indicating whether sensor i believes that its neighbor
j is compromised or not i.e. Iij = Ii(Tj = c). The secrecy capacity of the link
between sensor i and its local sink based on sensor i’s belief is
C˜a,i(Ti,T−i) =
[
Ca,i −
Ni∑
j=1
j−1∏
k=1
(1− Iiσk)IiσjCi,σj
]+
(6)
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where z+ := max(z, 0), T−i is the vector of types of the neighbors of i, Ca,i is
the channel capacity between sensor i and its local sink, and Ci,j is the channel
capacity between sensor i and its neighbor j. In our system, the channel capacity
between any two nodes r and s is given by:
Crs = W log
(
1 +
A|drs|−αP
γ2
)
, (7)
where W is the transmission bandwidth. Given this model, each uncompromised
sensor i will choose whether to transmit or switch to sleep mode in a way to
maximize a utility function that we will define next. In essence, when sensor i
is activated, the utility can be defined as the product of the conditional entropy
given by (4) and the achieved secrecy capacity in (6) minus the energy spent
Ei in each time instant. When sensor i switches to sleep mode, the utility
is given by the energy saved Ei minus the product of the conditional entropy
and the secrecy capacity, which represents the loss of information due to not
transmitting. Thus, the utility when transmitting corresponds to the cost when
switching to the sleep node. Let ai be a binary variable which is equal to one
if sensor i chooses to transmit and zero otherwise. Let a−i be the vector of
decisions made by the neighboring nodes of node i. Further, in order for the
attack not to get detected by the IoBT, the compromised sensors choose their
decision according to the same utility function as the uncompromised sensors.
Then, the utility of each sensor i can be defined as follows:
Ui(ai,a−i, Ti,T−i) =
D(Yi|Wi(a−i))× C˜s,i(Ti,T−i)− Ei, if ai = 1,Ei −D(Yi|Wi(a−i))× C˜s,i(Ti,T−i), if ai = 0, (8)
According to (8), the utility of sensor i depends on the decisions made by its
neighbors in its communication range and not on the decisions made by all the
IoBT sensors. Further, the utility of sensor i depends on its belief pi about the
probability of a neighbor being compromised. Thus, the problem is formulated
as a graphical Bayesian game [20] with incomplete information [21], as explained
next.
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3. IoBT Activation Graphical Bayesian Game
3.1. Game Formulation
The problem of activating the IoBT sensors is formulated as a graphi-
cal Bayesian game [20, 21] i.e. a game on a graph defined by
[
< G,<
Ti,Ai, pi, Ui >i∈M>
]
where G = (M, E) is an undirected graph represent-
ing the IoBT where each vertex i ∈M is a player of the game and corresponds
to an IoBT sensor, E is the set of edges where edge eij exists between players i
and j if they can directly communicate i.e. dij < r, Ti is the type of player i, Ai
is the action set of player i, pi(.|Ti) is the conditional probability distribution of
player i about the types of the other players in its neighborhood Ni given that
player i’s type is Ti and Ui is the payoff of player i.
In our game, any player can be of two types Ti ∈ {c, u}, where Ti = c
corresponds to a compromised node and Ti = u corresponds to uncompromised
node. The action set of each node is Ai = {0, 1}. The utility of each player
i Ui(ai,a−i, Ti,T−i) with respect to the actions and types of players in its
neighborhood is given by (8).
In order to solve our game, the graphical Bayesian Nash equilibrium (GBNE)
is adopted as follows.
3.2. Graphical Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
A strategy profile a∗ constitutes a GBNE if no player i has the incentive to
change its strategy given its neighbors’ strategies i.e.
a∗i ∈ arg max
∑
T−i
pi(T−i)ui(ai, a∗−i, Ti,T−i) ∀i ∈M (9)
In our originial game, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed to
exist. Thus, in order to ensure the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium,
we transform the game into a potential game by considering the repercussion
utility as done for allocation games in [23] and coalition formation games in [24].
The repercussion utility for each player in our IoBT activation graphical game
is defined as the utility of the player plus the change in the utility of the players
in its neighborhood caused by its presence i.e.
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qi(ai, a
′
−i, Ti,T
′
−i) =
Li(ai, a
′
−i, Ti,T
′
−i), if ai = 1,
Ui(ai, a−i, Ti,T−i), if ai = 0,
(10)
where Li(ai, a
′
−i, Ti,T
′
−i) = Ui(ai, a−i, Ti,T−i) +
∑
j∈Ni Uj(aj ,a−j , Tj ,T−j)−
Uj(aj , a˜−j , Tj ,T−j), a˜−j corresponds to the vector of strategies of the neighbors
of j with ai replaced by a˜i = 1− ai. Hence, each player, using the repercussion
utility, acts cooperatively and chooses a decision that does not degrade signifi-
cantly the utlities of the players in its neighborhood, thus improving the system
performance. Such a cooperative behavior is appropriate in an IoBT since it
relies only on information exchange among nodes within the same communica-
tion range, unlike conventional cooperative schemes that require communication
among all the nodes, and, therefore, it does not incur significant communication
overhead. Besides, the repercussion utility defined in (10) assumes that a given
player i has information about the utilities of the neighbors of its neighbors.
Thus, initially, IoBT sensors in the same communication range exchange infor-
mation about their neighbors prior to computing their optimal strategies. In
the modified graphical game, the new set of players influencing player i’s utility
include the neighbors of its neighbors i.e. N ′i = Ni∪j∈NiNj and the vectors a′−i
and T ′−i are the strategy vector and type vector of players in N ′i , respectively.
The following proposition shows that the our modified game with the utility
defined in (10), based on repercussion utilities, is a Bayesian potential game.
Proposition 1. Our IoBT graphical game with utilities defined in (10) is a
Bayesian potential game where the potential function V is the sum of the player
original utililties i.e. V (ai,a−i,T ) =
∑
i∈M Ui(ai,a−i, Ti,T−i), where T is the
vector of types of all players.
Proof. Fix any player i and let T is the vector of types of all players. For any
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T and a−i, we have
V (ai,a−i,T )− V (a˜i,a−i,T ) = Ui(ai,a−i, Ti,T−i)− Ui(a˜i,a−i, Ti,T−i)
+
∑
j∈M,j 6=i
(Uj(aj ,a−j , Tj ,T−j)− Uj(aj , a˜−j , Tj ,T−j))
= Ui(ai,a−i, Ti,T−i)− Ui(a˜i,a−i, Ti,T−i)
+
∑
j∈Ni
(Uj(aj ,a−j , Tj ,T−j)− Uj(aj , a˜−j , Tj ,T−j))
= qi(ai,a
′
−i, Ti,T
′
−i)− qi(a˜i,a′−i, Ti,T ′−i), (11)
where the third equality follows from the fact that player i’s action affects
only its neighbors and the last equality is obtained based on the definition of
qi(ai,a−i, Ti,T ′−i) in (10).
Thus, according to (11), our IoBT graphical game with utilities defined in
(10) is a Bayesian potential game with the potential function equal to the sum
of original utilities of the players. Therefore, it admits a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium [22].
In order to find a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, we present a learning
algorithm, defined by Algorithm 1, based on the best response dynamics and
tailored to the characteristics of our IoBT graphical Bayesian game. The pro-
posed learning scheme allows the IoBT sensors to find their Nash equilibrium
strategy in a distributed fashion while taking into account the limited com-
munication range of the IoBT sensors. In particular, in each iteration of the
algorithm, each IoBT sensor i computes its optimal strategy given the current
strategy profile a′−i. Then, sensor i broadcasts its optimal strategy to its neigh-
bors which consequently broadcast sensor i strategy to their neighbors. The
process is repeated until convergence.
The proposed learning scheme is guaranteed to converge to a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium since the modified graphical Bayesian game is a Bayesian
potential game according to Proposition 1.
The performance of our IoBT graphical game, at equilibrium, is assessed
next.
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Algorithm 1: Nash Equilibrium Learning Algorithm for the IoBT graph-
ical Bayesian Game
1 Each sensor i ∈ M initializes its strategy vector a′−i.
2 repeat
3 foreach sensor i ∈ 1, ...,M do
4 Sensor i computes its best response.
5 Sensor i broadcasts its newly computed best response to its neighbors in Ni.
6 Each sensor j in Ni broadcasts the best response of sensor i to its neighbors in Nj
7 All devices in N ′i update their strategy vectors.
8 end
9 until convergence;
4. Simulation Results
For our results, we consider a rectangular area of size 100 m × 100 m in
which the sensors are randomly deployed according to a uniform distribution.
The values of the parameters considered are: W = 20 MHz, σ2 = −90.2 dBm,
β = 1, λ = 1, P = 0.1 W, r = 2 m, and T = 1 ms. The probability that
a given sensor is compromised is assumed to be the same for all sensors i.e.
pi = pe ∀i ∈M where pe is a constant. Two scenarios are considered:
• The probability that a sensor is compromised is varied between 0 to 1 in
steps of 0.1. Two values of the total number of sensors are considered:
M = 1000 and M = 3000.
• The total number of sensors is varied between 500 to 5000 in steps of 500.
Two values of the probability that a sensor is compromised are considered:
pe = 0.1, 0.5.
For comparison, a baseline in which all the sensors are activated is considered,
and for the considered scenarios, 1000 independent simulation runs are per-
formed. Then, at equilibrium, the average number of activated sensors, the
average entropy of the activated sensors, and the average percentage decrease
in the energy consumed using the equilibrium solution compared to the baseline
are computed. Algorithm 1 converges in at most 5 iterations.
Fig. 2 shows the average number of activated sensors resulting from the equi-
librium solution versus the probability that a sensor is compromised pe when the
13
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Figure 2: Number of activated sensors ver-
sus the probability that a sensor is com-
promised for different values of the num-
ber of sensors.
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Figure 3: Percentage decrease of energy
consumed versus the probability that a
sensor is compromised for different num-
bers of sensors.
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Figure 4: Joint entropy of activated sensors versus the probability that a sensor is compromised
for different numbers of sensors.
total number of sensors M is 1000 and 3000, respectively. For both considered
values of M , the number of activated sensors decreases as the probability that a
sensor is compromised increases. This is because the increase in the probability
of an eavedropper decreases the secrecy capacity which consequently results in
decreasing the utility of transmitting. Also, Fig. 2 shows that when M increases
from 1000 to 3000, the number of activated sensors decreases for all considered
values of pe. This is due to the fact that, as the number of sensors increases, the
proportion of compromised sensors increases which causes the secrecy capacity
to decrease, and hence, fewer sensors are activated.
Fig. 3 shows the percentage decrease of energy consumed using the equi-
librium solution compared to the baseline versus the probability that a sensor
14
1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
Total number of sensors
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
a
c
ti
v
a
te
d
 s
e
n
s
o
rs
Probability that a sensor is compromised p
e
 = 0.1
Probability that a sensor is compromised p
e
 = 0.5
Figure 5: Number of activated sensors ver-
sus the total number of sensors for differ-
ent values of the probability that a sensor
is compromised.
1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
Total number of sensors
0
20
40
60
80
100
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 o
f 
to
ta
l 
e
n
e
rg
y
 c
o
n
s
u
m
e
d
Probability that a sensor is compromised p
e
 = 0.1
Probability that a sensor is compromised p
e
 = 0.5
Figure 6: Percentage decrease of energy
consumed versus the total number of sen-
sors for different values of the probability
that a sensor is compromised.
is compromised when the total number of sensors M is 1000 and 3000, respec-
tively. As shown in Fig. 3, the percentage decrease in the energy consumed
increases significantly as the probability that a sensor is compromised increases.
This is due to the significant decrease in the number of activated sensors as
shown in Fig. 2. The percentage decrease in the energy consumed reaches up
to 97% when M = 3000 and pe = 1.
Fig. 4 shows the average joint entropy of the activated sensors using the
equilibrium solution versus the probability that a sensor is compromised when
the total number of sensors M is 1000 and 3000, respectively. Fo all considered
values of pe, the joint entropy is positive, yet it decreases with the probability
that a sensor is compromised, due to the decrease in the number of activated
sensors as shown in Fig. 2. As for the baseline, the joint entropy is −∞. This
is because the considered number of sensors corresponds to a dense deployment
of the IoBT and all the sensors are activated in the baseline. Thus, the sensor’s
data given the remaining sensor’s measurements becomes deterministic. Thus,
Fig. 4 demonstrates that the proposed approach is effective in reducing the
redundancy in the transmitted information. Fig. 4 also shows the tradeoff
between the secrecy level and the information transmitted by the IoBT sensors.
Fig. 5 shows the average number of activated sensors at the GBNE as a
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Figure 7: Joint entropy of activated sen-
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Figure 8: Number of iterations until con-
vergence versus total number of sensors.
function of the total number of sensors when pe is 0.1 and 0.5, respectively. Fig.
2 shows that, for both considered values of the probability pe, the number of
activated sensors decreases as the total number of devices increases. This is
due to the fact that, as the density of sensors increases, the secrecy capacity
decreases, which consequently increases the utility of each sensor and causes
fewer number of sensors to be activated.
Fig. 6 shows the percentage decrease in the total energy consumed using
the equilibrium solution compared to the baseline versus the total number of
sensors M when pe is 0.1 and 0.5, respectively. Fig. 6 shows that the percentage
decrease in the energy consumed increases with M due to the decrease in the
number of activated sensors, as shown in Fig. 5. Fig. 6 confirms the significant
decrease in the total energy consumed using the equilibrium solution compared
to the baseline. The decrease in the total energy consumed reaches up to 98%
when M = 5000 and pe = 1.
Fig. 7 shows the average joint entropy of the activated sensors at the GBNE
as a function of the total number of sensors M when the probability that a
sensor is compromised pe is 0.1 and 0.5, respectively. As shown in Fig. 7 for
both considered values of pe, the joint entropy decreases as the number of devices
increases, due to the decrease in the number of activated sensors according to
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Fig. 5. As for the baseline, the value of joint entropy remains −∞ as the
density of the devices increases. Thus, Fig. 7 shows that, using the equilibrium
solution, the redundancy of the transmitted information is reduced significantly
compared to the baseline, as M increases.
Fig. 8 shows the maximum, minimum, and average number of iterations
spent until Algorithm 1’s convergence as a function of the total number of
sensors. The value of the probability that a sensor is compromised pe is 0.1.
According to Fig. 8, the maximum number of iterations is 4 when the total
number of sensors is less than or equal to 3500. When the number of sensors
becomes greater than or equal to 4000, the maximum number of iterations
increases by only one iterations and becomes 5. As for the average number of
sensors, its value is 2.5 when the number of sensors is 1000. Then, the average
number of iterations increases slightly with the number of sensors until it reaches
3.55 when the number of sensors is 5000. Fig. 8 also shows that the minimum
number of iterations is 2 for all considered number of sensors. Thus, Fig. 8
demonstrates the fast convergence of Algorithm 1 for large number of devices.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered the problem of secure sensor activation in
the Internet of Battlefield Things in which each sensor decides whether to trans-
mit or not in order to maximize its payoff which is a function of the secrecy rate
as well as the redundancy of the transmitted information. We have formulated
the problem as a graphical Bayesian game and have shown that the proposed
game is Bayesian potential game. We have proposed a learning algorithm that
is suitable for our IoBT graphical game and that is guaranteed to converge to a
Nash equilibrium. Our results have shown the tradeoff between the information
transmitted by the IoBT sensors and the desired secrecy level. Our results have
also shown the effectiveness of the proposed approach in reducing the energy
consumed compared to the baseline in which all the IoBT sensors are activated.
The reduction in energy consumption reaches up to 98% compared to the base-
line, when the number of sensors is 5000. For future work, we will extend this
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work to include other attack types, such as those in which incorrect information
is transmitted.
References
References
[1] M. Tortonesi, A. Morelli, M. Govoni, J. Michaelis, N. Suri, C. Stefanelli, and S. Russell,
“Leveraging Internet of Things within the military network environment Challenges and
solutions,” in Proc. of IEEE World Forum on Internet of Things (WF-IoT), Reston,
VA, USA, Dec. 2016, pp. 111-116.
[2] M. Mozaffari, W. Saad, M. Bennis, and M. Debbah, “Unmanned aerial vehicle with
underlaid device-to-device communications: performance and tradeoffs,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Wireless Communications, vol. 15, no. 6, pp. 3949 - 3963, Jun. 2016.
[3] E. Schulz, M. Speekenbrink, and A. Krause, “A tutorial on Gaussian pro-
cess regression: Modelling, exploring, and exploiting functions,” in bioRxiv,
https://www.biorxiv.org/content/early/2017/10/10/095190.
[4] K. Zhao and L. Ge, “A survey on the Internet of Things security,” in Proc. of Inter-
national Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security, Leshan, China, Dec.
2013, pp. 663-667.
[5] J. Zhang, L. Xu and H. Yang, “A novel sleep scheduling algorithm for wireless sensor
networks,” in Proc. of International Conference on Intelligent Information Hiding and
Multimedia Signal Processing (IIH-MSP), Adelaide, SA, Australia, Sep. 2015, pp. 364-
367.
[6] I. Alafeef, F. Awad and N. Al-Madi, “Energy-aware geographic routing protocol with
sleep scheduling for wireless multimedia sensor networks,” in Proc. of International
Conference on Smart Cities: Improving Quality of Life Using ICT & IoT (HONET-
ICT), Irbid, Jordan, Oct. 2017, pp. 93-97.
[7] T. Zheng, S. Radhakrishnan and V. Sarangan, “A routing layer sleep scheme for data
gathering in wireless sensor networks,” in Proc. of IEEE International Conference on
Communications (ICC), Ottawa, ON, Canada, Jun. 2012, pp. 735-739.
[8] T. Canli, F. Nait-Abdesselam and A. Khokhar, “A cross-layer optimization approach
for efficient data gathering in wireless sensor networks,” in Proc. of IEEE International
Networking and Communications Conference, Lahore, Pakistan, May. 2008, pp. 101-106.
18
[9] P. Sharma, A. Khan, A. Narasimhan, S. Ramalingam and S. K. Tripathi, “Energy conser-
vation in sensor networks through selective node activation,” in Proc. of International
Symposium on a World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks, Buffalo, NY,
USA, Jun. 2006, pp. 115-124.
[10] R. Yu, X. Wang and S. K. Das, “An information entropy approach for sleep scheduling
in densely-deployed sensor networks,” in Proc. of IEEE International Conference on
Mobile Ad-hoc and Sensor Networks, Dalian, China, Dec. 2013, pp. 181-186.
[11] W. Chen and I. J. Wassell, “Compressive sleeping wireless sensor networks with active
node selection,” in Proc. of IEEE Global Communications Conference, Austin, TX,
USA, Dec. 2014, pp. 7-12.
[12] M. Patan and D. Ucski, “A sparsity-enforcing method for optimal node activation in
parameter estimation of spatiotemporal processes,” in Proc. IEEE Annual Conference
on Decision and Control, Melbourne, Australia, Dec. 2017, pp. 3089-3094.
[13] C. Danratchadakorn and C. Pornavalai, “Coverage maximization with sleep scheduling
for wireless sensor networks,” in Proc. International Conference on Electrical Engineer-
ing/Electronics, Computer, Telecommunications and Information Technology, Hua Hin,
Thailand, Jun. 2015, pp. 1-6.
[14] M. Chenait, B. Zebbane, C. Benzaid and N. Badache, “Sleep scheduling with predictive
coverage redundancy check in wireless sensor networks,” in Proc. of International Sym-
posium on Wireless Communication Systems (ISWCS), Brussels, Belgium, Aug. 2015,
pp. 366-370.
[15] S. Shen, H. Li, R. Han, A. V. Vasilakos, Y. Wang, and Q. Cao, “Differential game-based
strategies for preventing malware propagation in wireless sensor networks,” in IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 9, no. 11, pp. 1962-1973, Nov.
2014.
[16] G. Jiang, S. Shen, K. Hu, L. Huang, H. Li, and R. Han. “Evolutionary game-based
secrecy rate adaptation in wireless sensor networks” in Proc. of International Journal
of Distributed Sensor Networks, Mar. 2015. pp. 1-13.
[17] Y. Kwon, X. Wang and T. Hwang, “A game With randomly distributed Eavesdroppers in
wireless ad hoc networks: A secrecy EE perspective,” in IEEE Transactions on Vehicular
Technology, vol. 66, no. 11, pp. 9916-9930, Nov. 2017.
[18] Y. Zou, J. Zhu, G. Wang and H. Shao, “Secrecy outage probability analysis of multi-user
multi-eavesdropper wireless systems,” in Proc. of IEEE/CIC International Conference
on Communications in China (ICCC), Shanghai, China, Oct. 2014, pp. 309-313.
19
[19] A. Krause, A. Singh, and C. Guestrin, “Near-optimal sensor placements in Gaussian
processes: Theory, efficient algorithms and empirical studies,” in Journal of Machine
Learning Research, vol. 9, pp. 235-284, Feb. 2009.
[20] M. Kearns, “Graphical games” in: Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007, pp. 159-180.
[21] Z. Han, D. Niyato, W. Saad, T. Bas¸ar, and A. Hjørungnes, Game Theory in Wireless and
Communication Networks: Theory, Models, and Applications, Cambridge University
Press, 2012.
[22] T. Ui, “Bayesian potentials and information structures: Team decision problems revis-
ited”, International Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 5 no. 3, pp. 271-291, Sep. 2009.
[23] P. Coucheney, C. Touati and B. Gaujal, “Selection of efficient pure strategies in allocation
games,” in Proc. of International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, Istanbul,
Turkey, May 2009, pp. 658-666.
[24] N. Abuzainab, S. R. Vinnakota and C. Touati, “Coalition formation game for cooperative
cognitive radio using Gibbs Sampling,” in Proc. of IEEE Wireless Communications and
Networking Conference (WCNC), New Orleans, LA, USA, Mar. 2015, pp. 937-942.
20
